102 comptime obligation leak

// NEGATIVE TEST (designed rejection ORDERING — comptime obligation
// checking, ruled 2026-07-06). The gap is sharper than "comptime is
// unchecked": the analysis-time checker DOES see comptime flows and
// DOES reject this leak (KORU030) — but only AFTER evaluate-comptime
// has already RUN the flow. Observed 2026-07-06: the sink printed
// "comptime input" (twice — fold + evaluate both walk it) BEFORE the
// rejection. Taint reached the sink during compilation; the build
// failed after the exfiltration. Checked-but-too-late.
//
// The ruled fix: run the SAME phantom checker as a frontend segment
// scoped to [comptime]-marked items, BEFORE process-template-procs
// (compiler.kz:828), with a comptime-scoped auto-discharge run ahead
// of it. One implementation of obligation semantics, two executions
// disciplined — and comptime side effects can never precede their own
// rejection.
//
// This is 330_069's taint shape, comptime-marked. The NOT_CONTAINS
// assertion is the pin's point: rejection must fire before the sink
// can produce output. Also wanted from the fix: the diagnostic names
// the comptime context and the real source location (today it points
// at auto_discharge:33:0). Double-evaluation is a separate observation
// to investigate.

const std = @import("std");

~[comptime] pub event get-input {}
| line []const u8<unsanitized!>

~[comptime] get-input => line "comptime input"

~[comptime] pub event sink { s: []const u8 }
~proc sink|zig {
    std.debug.print("{s}\n", .{s});
}

~[comptime] get-input()
| line s |> sink(s)